The famous passage from Descartes' Sixth Meditation (54), proving that I am distinct from my body, is analysed in a way that it presupposes the following argument: (1) God can make X and Y distinct. (2) I f God can make X and Y distinct, then X and Y are distinct. (3) Therefore, X and Y are distinct. (2) is shown up as the crucial premise, several objections to it and possible ways out are discussed with the result that Descartes (...) needs to avoid references to God within the argument for the real distinctness of mind and body. (shrink)

In Dancing Souls Bencivenga addresses the crucial question of how the subject can be one and multiple at the same time. He finds that this phenomenon is like the disciplined movement of the dancer through space. Bencivenga explores the structure of this ontological betweenness in its various levels of complexity from the most intimately personal to the communal and the political.

Meinong justifies the need of his Gegenstandstheorie by presenting it as a generalization of (existing) metaphysics, in that the former deals with both existent and non-existent objects, whereas the latter used to deal with existent objects only. But this justification is disingenuous, since the notion of a non-existent object is virtually a contradiction in terms for the traditional paradigm. What Meinong is really proposing is a conceptual revolution of a Kantian variety, and we need to get clearer about the full (...) import of this revolution. This is what the present paper attempts to do. (shrink)

Leggiamo nell'Histoire de la philosophie cartèsienne, di Francisque Boullier, che giorno, mentre Malebranche e Fontenelle entravano nell'Oratoire Saint-Honoré, la cagna di casa, gravida, si avvicinò a Malebranche per fargli delle effusioni, ricevendone però solo calci. Quando Fontenelle sembrò commuoversi, fu liquidato con una sentenza: 'Non lo sai che non sente nulla?'. Malebranche era un filosofo cartesiano e, così agendo e parlando, stava traendo ovvie conclusioni dalle Meditazioni del maestro: solo chi ha una mente prova sensazioni; gli animali sono pura materia (...) e non hanno una mente; se si lamentano, i suoni che emettono valgono come i rumori emessi da una macchina. Questa metafisica stracciona, divulgata in un periodo storico in cui Giordano Bruno e Tommaso Campanella descrivevano invece un universo interamente animato, è risultata vincente nel mondo contemporaneo e ne ha sottoscritto l'atteggiamento predatorio e sfruttatore nei confronti della Natura. Schiavista, anche, perché forse anche i popoli diversi da quello dominante 'non sentono nulla'. È tempo di riscrivere le meditazioni cartesiane, non perché la metafisica abbia mai cambiato il mondo ma per eliminare gli alibi e i pretesti che una cattiva metafisica, serva dei potenti, è lieta di offrire loro. Bencivenga si dedica qui a questo compito, e lasceremo che siano le sue pagine a parlare. Aggiungeremo solo che Bruno e Campanella, oltre a Kant, sono i fari che gli illuminano la strada, e che scrive dal punto di vista di una cagna gravida e maltrattata."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

If graduate school is a kind of professional school, then graduate school in philosophy should train students in the many facets of the profession. This paper describes the nature of the “philosophy workshop” by comparing and contrasting it to two other components of graduate school: lecture courses and research seminars. In contrast to lecture courses that provide a large quantity of information in a succinct and well-guided fashion, and research seminars that concentrate on a specific topic or line of argument, (...) philosophy workshops offers students (and instructors) a more exploratory and more open-ended approach to learning philosophy. (shrink)

No other natural kind receives as much abuse in the Aristotelian corpus as the octopus, and an instructive itinerary through that corpus can be constructed by following the manifestations of such abuse. Specifically, the octopus is judged “stupid” and endowed with poor, rudimentary structure; together with fellow cephalopoda and mollusks, it is even regarded as behaving “contrary to nature.” The moral that emerges from following this path is that Aristotle may be expressing here a deep conflict between two different models (...) equally present in his work, though they are assigned very different emphasis. Also, importantly, mollusks are said to be “mutilated,” which aligns the treatment they receive with the one Aristotle famously reserves for women. (shrink)

Dieses Buch bietet eine elementare, in sich geschlossene Einführung in die analytische Sprachphilosophie anhand einer systematischen und chronologischen Behandlung der Referenzproblematik: Welche Rollen spielen die singulären Terme (vor allem Eigennamen und Kennzeichnungen) in natürlichen Sprachen? Es werden die Lösungsversuche Meinongs, Freges, Russells, Carnaps, Strawsons, Donnellans und Kripkes rekonstruiert und miteinander verglichen. Jeder der Beiträge dieser bedeutenden analytischen Philosophen wird unter drei Gesichtspunkten betrachtet. Erstens: Was leistet er zur Lösung des Problems der leeren Referenz? (Was z.B. bedeutet ein singulärer Term wie (...) «Pegasus», der nichts zu bezeichnen scheint?) Zweitens: Was leistet er zur Lösung des Problems des ausgeschlossenen Dritten? (Ist z.B. ein Satz wie «Pegasus ist weiss oder Pegasus ist nicht weiss», der gemäss dem Gesetz vom ausgeschlossenen Dritten logisch wahr sein müsste, in Wirklichkeit falsch?) Drittens: Was leistet er zur Lösung des Problems der indirekten Kontexte? (Wie kommt es z.B., dass «Peter glaubt, dass der Abendstern ein Fixstern ist» wahr und «Peter glaubt, dass der Morgenstern ein Fixstern ist» falsch sein kann?). (shrink)

Meinong justifies the need of his Gegenstandstheorie by presenting it as a generalization of (existing) metaphysics, in that the former deals with both existent and non-existent objects, whereas the latter used to deal with existent objects only. But this justification is disingenuous, since the notion of a non-existent object is virtually a contradiction in terms for the traditional paradigm. What Meinong is really proposing is a conceptual revolution of a Kantian variety, and we need to get clearer about the full (...) import of this revolution. This is what the present paper attempts to do. (shrink)

On philosophy and the philosophers in contemporary society.

This book offers insight into the nature of meaningful discourse. It presents an argument of great intellectual scope written by an author with more than four decades of experience. Readers will gain a deeper understanding into three theories of the logos: analytic, dialectical, and oceanic. The author first introduces and contrasts these three theories. He then assesses them with respect to their basic parameters: necessity, truth, negation, infinity, as well as their use in mathematics. Analytic Aristotelian logic has traditionally claimed (...) uniqueness, most recently in its Fregean and post-Fregean variants. Dialectical logic was first proposed by Hegel. The account presented here cuts through the dense, often incomprehensible Hegelian text. Oceanic logic was never identified as such, but the author gives numerous examples of its use from the history of philosophy. The final chapter addresses the plurality of the three theories and of how we should deal with it. The author first worked in analytic logic in the 1970s and 1980s, first researched dialectical logic in the 1990s, and discovered oceanic logic in the 2000s. This book represents the culmination of reflections that have lasted an entire scholarly career. (shrink)

Este trabajo está dedicado al análisis de dos legados fundamentales de Thomas Hobbes al pensamiento político moderno, en la lectura que de ello ha ofrecido Norberto Bobbio. El primero es un legado de carácter metodológico, que consiste en dar prioridad a la demostratio por encima de cualquier forma de interpretatio. El segundo es el individualismo, cuyas diferentes declinaciones son decisivas para fundar, medir y valorar las diversas fórmulas políticas que el Leviatán, en cuanto esencia del Estado moderno, puede albergar. El (...) trabajo se cierra con un tercer nivel de comparación sobre la fortuna de Hobbes y de Bobbio entre sus contemporáneos y en nuestros días. (shrink)

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A THEORY OF REFERENCE AS AN INTENTIONAL ACT, INDEPENDENT OF THE METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A REAL (AND COMMON) WORLD. ACCORDING TO THE THEORY, SPEAKERS REFER TO ENTITIES IN THEIR COGNITIVE SPACES. DIFFERENT SPEAKERS HAVE DIFFERENT SPACES, WHICH AT ANY GIVEN TIME MIRROR THEIR BELIEF-SYSTEMS AT THAT TIME. OBJECTS IN COGNITIVE SPACES ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM IDEAS, "SINNE", AND MEINONGIAN NON-EXISTENTS, AND SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE THEORY ARE DISCUSSED: AMONG THEM, HOW TO HANDLE COMMUNICATION AND TRUTH.

A selection of Perlman's (social service, U. of Chicago) recent essays responsibility, and who need ongoing support to better center themselves in their professions. No index. of relevance for contemporary social work, especially in its casework and groupwork forms. The selections reflect two concerns. First is the number of entrants to social work (and frequently to the most difficult publicly supported welfare programs) who have only rudimentary education in the field, and need the support of ongoing education to help them (...) maintain focus and direction. The second concern is with the number of more advanced graduates who have been prematurely placed in positions with supervisory or teaching Working from within the analytic tradition, and employing analytic tools, distinctions, and methods of argument, Bencivenga (philosophy, U. of California-Irvine) attempts to transform and save the tradition, under increasing assault by its post-analytic critics. Eleven essays (nine previously published) cover topics in aesthetics, language, logic, metaphysics, ethics, and meta-philosophy. Cloth edition (unseen), $35. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

Urban gaming simulation appeared in American universities in the early 1960s, following the successful applications of gaming simulations in military and financial fields, when urban structures were in crisis. This guest column, by a philosopher who has speculated about philosophy and other cultural endeavors as forms of play, points out conceptual traps that specialists in UGS should avoid and decisions they ought to consider making. In particular, the author warns against making too much of the distinction between “games” and “play” (...) and advises UGS practitioners to conceive of their own activity as playful and exploratory. He argues that practitioners should approach clients not as “professionals” but rather as people with experience acquired from much play, on many different terrains. The essay concludes by suggesting that professionals in all fields—scientific and otherwise—ought to see themselves in much the same way. (shrink)

Translated by the author from his Tre Dialoghi, published in 1989 by Bollati Boringhieri Editore. In this lively collection of dialogues, Bencivenga endeavors to be true to the nature of philosophical practice- its constant superseding of its own results, its open-endedness, its paradoxical turning of a position into its opposite- as he explores issues ranging from feminism to metaphysics, from the philosophy of science to aesthetics, as well as the intrinsically dialogic nature of philosophical activity itself.

Vitale plantea un razonamiento en torno a la existencia y naturaleza de los llamados «derechos colectivos». Tomando al antiguo filósofo Carnéades como pretexto y simple inspiración, el autor explora los argumentos tanto a favor como en contra de la existencia de comunidades homogéneas y de los derechos atribuibles a colectivos. Según Vitale, en ninguno de los dos casos la existencia o inexistencia de derechos colectivos obtie-ne un fundamento sólido. En el fondo, el multiculturalismo no logra evitar la contradic-ción que consiste (...) en el hecho de que los derechos particulares reivindicados por cada una de las comunidades terminan por ser totalmente incompatibles con aquellos igualmente particulares reivindicados por las otras comunidades. (shrink)

The article aims to assess Hobbes’ methodological legacy. After a brief review of different interpretations of Hobbes relevant to the subject, I center the discussion on the reading advanced by Norberto Bobbio and the notion of three “different forms and levels of rationality”: First, Hobbes’ dichotomy-based reasoning that radically contended the Aristotelian tradition, as well as biblical hermeneutics used by medieval theologians. Second, individualism as a method for collective decision making, one that led to socalled “game theory” and moral individualism (...) (quite significant in contemporary political philosophy). Finally, the rationality of political power that imposes on Sovereignty binding rules for gaining and maintaining power.After the discussion of the three different forms and levels of rationality, the article concludes that Thomas Hobbes, instead of being primarilyre- ferred to as an advocate of autocratic regimes, should be considered, at the very beginning of the long history of rule of law, as one of the key authors of modern constitutionalism and democracy.Resumen:Después de un rápido recorrido sobre las múltiples interpretaciones del pensamiento hobbesiano, el ensayo retoma y desarrolla la lectura que de Hobbes propuso Norberto Bobbio. Con base en esta lectura, se busca evaluar el legado metodológico de Hobbes, el cual se despliega a través de distintos niveles de racionalidad: en primer lugar, el razonamiento basado en dicotomías, el cual desafió de manera contundente la tradición aristotélica, la labor de los historiadores antiguos y la hermenéutica bíblica de los teólogos medievales. En segundo lugar, el individualismo como método para tomar decisiones colectivas, lo que abrió la puerta a la así llamada “teoría de juegos” y al individualismo moral tan notable en la filosofía política contemporánea. Y finalmente, la racionalidad del poder político, que lógicamente impone sobre la soberanía ciertas reglas vinculantes para obtener y mantener el poder.En conjunto, con el análisis de las distintas formas y niveles de racionalidad se pretende respaldar la idea de que Hobbes —antes de ser identificado como un defensor de regímenes autocráticos— puede ser considerado como un autor clave para la democracia y el constitucionalismo moderno, colocado en el justo inicio de la larga historia del Estado de derecho. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus on Norberto Bobbio’s reflections on human rights. Firstly, I seek to establish his underlying conception of philosophy: although it is impossible to spell out the philosophical foundations of human rights, this does not imply that philosophical thought, in the sense of critical reason, cannot make a useful contribution and provide valuable arguments in support of human rights. Secondly, I examine the related issue of the justification of human rights and assess his theory on the basis (...) of its own conception of a possible foundation. The way we answer the question of coherence also clarifies (a) what model of civil association is compatible with such a foundation, i.e. with such a worldview; (b) what model is absolutely incompatible with it; and finally (c) what intermediate solutions are there, if there are any. I argue that the communitarian variants of the conception of rights are distortions: collective or cultural rights, i.e. rights of a community towards which all of its members have duties, appearing alongside individual rights, trump individual rights, i.e. the rights linked to personhood that once constituted the most effective legal and political means for emancipating the individual from the power of the community. I therefore consider the “Copernican Revolution” of individualism and its consequences in Bobbio’s thought. As the example of personal freedom shows, where rights are ascribed principally to groups or communities rather than to individuals, we have good reason to fear that rights will turn out to be merely the privilege of the few. Once we follow this line of though in Bobbio, the ecumenical openness to alternative approaches and the argument from “the consensus of the people” yield to a clearly universalistic perspective that derives from the Enlightenment and can be interpreted as the product of the specifically modern version of natural law theory. (shrink)